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Abstract— Security within the cloud is of paramount 
importance as the interest and indeed utilization of cloud 
computing increase.  Multitenancy in particular introduces 
unique security risks to cloud computing as a result of more 
than one tenant utilizing the same physical computer hardware 
and sharing the same software and data.  The purpose of this 
paper is to explore the specific risks in cloud computing due to 
Multitenancy and the measures that can be taken to mitigate 
those risks. 




Cloud Computing is quickly being adopted by 
organizations and businesses alike to help increase profit 
margins by decreasing overall IT costs as well as provide 
clients with faster implementation of services.  The 
majority of the cloud service providers offer multitenancy 
to capitalize on the associated economies of scale which 
also translates into savings for the end user.  In fact the 
competitive nature of cloud computing is such that cloud 
service providers have to minimize the total cost of  
ownership of their IT infrastructure, thus introducing   
multitenancy   is   a  popular way to reducing total cost of 
ownership [7]. However, multitenancy introduces a unique 
set of security risks, which has yet to be fully 
acknowledged as a serious problem by policy makers and 
cloud service providers [1].  This paper will explore the 
risks associated with multitenancy and measures which can 
be taken to overcome them. Multitenancy is the practice of 
placing multiple tenants on the same physical hardware to 
reduce costs to the user by leveraging economies of scale. 
Tsai defines a tenant as a user in the cloud or a human 
being [6]. 
 Multitenancy has made cloud computing popular by 
allowing businesses to benefit from reduced costs yet 
continue to gain access to data and applications within a 
cloud environment [1].  Multitenancy is similar in nature to 
multiple families in the same condominium. Generally 
speaking each has their own space, however there is a risk 
that one family may have access to another families space 
or information. Wood and Anderson describe multitenancy 
as the ability to run multiple customers on a single software 
instance installed on multiple servers [1].  In the 
multitenancy model, many users data and resources are 
located in the same computing cloud, and are controlled 
and distinguished through the use of tagging for the unique 
identification of resources owned by individual user [1]. In   
a typical multitenancy situation, the users are the tenants 
and are provided with a level of control in order to 
customize and tailor software and hardware to fit their 
specific needs [1]. 
 
MULTITENANCY SECURITY THREATS 
 
The fundamental security issue with multitenancy is the 
very premise in which multitenancy is based upon; that is, 
multiple tenants sharing the same computer hardware.   
Indeed, using a multitenancy approach for the development 
of public cloud infrastructure presents a number of 
challenges in terms of compliance, security and privacy [1].  
One of the main  challenges  of  using  this  form  of  
multiple  services  is ensuring data isolation. Data 
management is critical as several users will be using the 
same system but all require privacy and confidently [1].  
Indeed multitenancy  and  lack  of  network  isolation  
among  tenants make  the  public cloud  vulnerable  to  
attacks [5].   
Lack of efficient bandwidth and traffic isolation makes 
multitenancy in cloud computing vulnerable, since 
malicious tenants may launch attacks towards co-resident 
tenants in the same cloud data centre [5].  Current 
approaches to access control on clouds do not scale well to 
multitenancy requirements because they are mostly based 
on individual user IDs [6].  By its very nature multitenancy 
has increased  security risks due to the sharing of  software 
and data by  multiple tenants. As these  collocated  tenants  
may  be  competitors, if  the  barriers between  tenants  are  
broken down,  one  tenant  may  access another tenant’s 
data or interfere with their applications. Indeed, cloud 
providers are responsible for ensuring that one customer 
cannot break into another customer’s data and applications 
[6].  
In a multitenant environment side-channel attacks pose 
significant risks in a cloud computing environment. Side- 
channel  attacks  are  based on information obtained from 
bandwidth-monitoring or other similar techniques.    Side-
channel  attacks  typically occur due  to  lack of  
authorization  mechanisms  for  sharing physical resources. 
The interference among tenants exists primarily because of 
covert channels with  flawed  access  control policies that 
allow unauthorized access  [2].  Indeed the multitenancy 
architecture has increased  the  risk  of  database exposure  
and  thus,  data  protection  today is more crucial than ever.    
Another security risk associated with multitenancy is 
interference between tenants because of  tenant workloads. 
For example an overload created by one  tenant  may  
negatively  impact  the   performance  of  another tenant 
[7].  A third, and obvious,  risk of multitenancy is resources 
being  assigned to consumers whose identities, and 
intentions,  are  unknown.    Practically all  virtualization 
platforms on the market  today have    a    trusted    
virtualization    layer    that,    if compromised,  leads  
directly  to  full compromise  of  any  of the  virtual  
machines  running on  the  physical  host [7].    This could 
result in the inability to monitor  activity  on  the  virtual 
machine,  and  possibly allowing a malicious user to  alter  
the  state  of  the virtual  machine.  Virtualization   layers   
are   complex   software systems.  This complexity 
inevitably leads to vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities that  could  
allow  a  virtual  machine  user  to gain  control  of  the 
virtualization  layer,  and  from  there   gain  control  of all  
other  virtual  machines  running  on  the same physical 
host [8].  A fourth security risk inherent to multitenant 
systems is uncoordinated change controls and 
misconfigurations. When multiple tenants are sharing the 
underlying infrastructure it is possible that changes may 
lead to a security breach allowing one tenant to gain access 
to another tenants data or resources.  A fifth security risk 
may result from comingled tenant data.  To reduce cost,  
providers may  store data from multiple tenants in the same 
database table-spaces and/or backup tapes. In this scenario 
a data deletion request may become a challenge resulting 
on portions of data not being properly deleted.  
 
ARCHITECTING COUNTERMEASURES FOR MULITENANCY 
SECURITY RISK   
 
The previous section of this paper has focused on 
security risks that have surfaced in the Cloud computing 
model, as a result of Multitenant Architecture (MTA), and 
as a result of MTA being implemented by Cloud Service 
Providers (CSPs).  
This section will discuss some countermeasures to Cloud 
security risks. In IT security analytics, it is rarely the case 
that there is a clear, obvious countermeasure to mitigate 
and manage every risk. Most security specialists therefore 
advocate a holistic approach to security policy management 
and technology implementations that support security 
policies.  Consequently, this section will deal with 
countermeasures for three broad categories of risk: 
 
• Governance, Control and Auditing – these risks 
pertain to the CSP’s services and the roles that 
tenants (clients, customers, or users) have in 
governing risk when using those services. These 
risks are largely technology-agnostic, and derive 
from governance and control frameworks for risk 
management that have their basis in conventional 
“premise data center” computing. These risks are 
equally applicable whether or not the target Cloud 
is IaaS, PaaS or SaaS. 
 
• Configuration, Design and Change 
Management – these risks are largely specific to 
multitenant Cloud architecture, although they may 
have had their genesis in pre-Cloud technology 
areas like virtualization and internetworking. 
Consequently, these risks are most clearly evident 
in IaaS and PaaS Cloud environments. 
 
• Logical Security, Access Control and 
Encryption – these risks are, in most cases, 
application-driven and as such are more applicable 
to PaaS and SaaS Cloud environments. They deal 
mostly in the design of security systems related to 
access to individual applications, data, or business 
function within an MTA-based Cloud service 
offering.  
 
1. Governance, Control and Auditing 
 
Separation of Duties (SoD):  
 
Within an IT context, Separation of Duties (SoD) refers 
to the system’s ability to segregate a single task, function or 
component into multiple areas of responsibility and 
assigning those areas to different roles or individuals. The 
goal of SoD is to reduce or eliminate conflicts of interest, 
and to guarantee that no single individual is given the 
opportunity to assume powers or capabilities beyond those 
defined for his or her role.  
The risks surrounding SoD in a cloud computing context 
center are mostly around role definition and clarification. 
Due to the rapid evolution of Cloud technologies, and the 
rapid uptake of commercial CSP offerings, there has been 
little time or opportunity for SoD rigor to develop and 
stabilize into standard roles. An example is the CSP role, 
particularly with regard to administrative access and 
security policy creation and enforcement CSP’s need to 
secure the services they offer, while not exceeding their 
customer’s authorities in any particular resource or data 
domain [4].  This extends to MTA environments, where 
multiple tenants may not have the same reliance on the 
CSP’s role in security management, or the same capability 
to take the security role in-house [9].  
This leads to ambiguity around the CSP’s role definition 
and SoD concerns. One emerging standards body, the 
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), holds that the CSP takes on 
greatest amount of security responsibility in SaaS, least in 
IaaS, with PaaS requiring the greatest amount of fine-
grained control [4].  
SoD is “baked in” to many commercial security 
products, including Enterprise Single Sign-On (ESSO) and 
Identity and Access Management (IAM) software sites. In 
general, current security products do not support adequate 
SoD separation for Cloud environments, since they are 
generally designed and implemented for a single security 
domain in which the owner and user of IT facilities are one 
and the same [4]. 
There has been some research in bridging the gap 
between the current state of distributed security products 
and MTA-based Cloud service offerings. Li, Zhou et al [4] 
have proposed the Multi-Tenancy Trusted Computing 
Environment Model (MTCEM). MTCEM implements the 
Trusted Computing Group’s (TCG: 
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org) Trusted 
Computing Platform (TCP), a set of standards, principles 
and technologies that enable a data owner or steward to 
implicitly and explicitly “trust”, and hold accountable, the 
underpinning computing infrastructure that runs the 
applications that create, store and manipulate their data. 
TCP contains two basic assertions: transitive trust and 
platform assertion. These will be discussed in detail in the 
next section. 
 
Auditing and Client Controls 
 
IT auditing frameworks like CobiT and Systrust rely on 
logging and data capture to provide positive evidence of 
adequate IT controls and governance. In essence, this 
means that all actions that change or modify the data or 
configuration of an IT system are logged, and that these 
logs are subject to standard policies on access, retention, 
archival and disposal.  
In conventional IT systems, this means auditing all 
administrative access to systems. In Cloud computing, this 
may mean that all tenants of an MTA Cloud service are 
audited in order to guarantee that they maintain a 
“minimum allowable security posture”. So even though a 
tenant’s policies may not require complete and verbose 
logging of administrative access, the CSP’s policies may 
mandate just that. This countermeasure helps to ensure that 
a weak tenant’s lax security posture cannot allow an 
intruder access to an infection vector with which to exploit 
and compromise another tenant’s Cloud-based services.  
Audit and access controls should therefore be part of the 
MTA’s usage terms and contract. Each client must be fully 
aware of the security implications of moving to the Cloud, 
and the responsibilities of the CSP and themselves in 
security administration and governance [1].  
 
2. Configuration, Design and Change Management 
 
Trusted Computing Platform and Environment 
 
The previous section introduced the concept of the 
Trusted Computing Platform as implemented in a 
multitenant environment – MTCEM, or Multitenant 
Trusted Computing Environment Model. 
MTCEM implements the two basic concepts of trusted 
computing, in a Multi-tenant Cloud context: Transitive 
Trust and Platform Attestation. 
 
• Transitive Trust - In Transitive Trust, a 
computing platform can only boot or initialize 
from a Core Root of Trust Measurement (CRTM), 
which may be microcode, a hardware chip or 
ROM module, or encrypted firmware that is 
signed by a certified authority and is assumed to 
be trustworthy. The initialization of a computing 
platform from the CRTM follows a pathway of 
trust through a bootstrap process, whereby one 
level of initialization can implicitly trust that the 
previous level is passing on a secure microkernel.  
 
An example of Transitive Trust is as follows: 
 
CRTM BIOSOS loaderOSApplications 
 
The TCP and the Transitive Trust model is part of 
most modern operating systems. MTCEM asserts 
that this model can be extended to Cloud 
computing. The Figure 1 summarizes what TCP 
might look like under MTCEM. 
 
• Platform attestation – this is a mechanism by 
which a computing platform proves to a third 
party that it is trusted. Platform attestation refers to 
a system’s capability to deem trustworthy by other 
systems with which it must interact, or to in turn 
be deemed trustworthy by those other systems. 
The challenge is to define a set of reasonable and 
measurable metrics that can be used to determine 
whether a computing platform is trusted. 
Attestation prototypes specific to Cloud 
computing have been built [4] that determine 
trustworthiness based on behavior history (i.e. 
does the peer system’s request conform to patterns 
of normal or expected computing behavior) or 
defined properties of the computing platform 
(memory status, checksum validation, etc.). 
 
 
Figure 1: Multi-tenant Trusted Computing 
                               Environment Model (MTCEM) 
 
The advantage of implementing MTCEM in a multi-
tenant environment, is that a given Host or Guest within an 
IaaS or PaaS Cloud can simultaneously belong to multiple, 
different security domains and serve multiple, different 
security subjects through different security policies.  
 
Securing Shared Services 
 
One of the basic underlying assumptions of Cloud 
computing is the concept of shared services. These 
services are available to each tenant in an MTA and form 
the fundamental value proposition of most CSP’s service 
offerings. However, shared services take on different 
meanings, depending on which kind of Cloud computing is 
in question.  
IaaS – In IaaS, each client’s hosted environment is 
partitioned and controlled by a single instance or version of 
hypervisor and virtualization software. Tenant environment 
depends on the security, integrity and robustness of the 
hypervisor software to effectively partition them from other 
tenants in the MTA.  
However, several recent exploits, including 
“Cloudburst” and “Blue Pill Project” have been used to 
allow a VMWare guest to escape to the host, and then 
compromise the hypervisor through a rootkit-based 
approach [10].  
The only effective countermeasure to these exploits is 
eternal vigilance on the part of the CSP, in maintaining, 
patching and upgrading their hypervisor software, and in 
implementing both network-based and host-based intrusion 
detection and prevention systems that can detect, alert and 
otherwise guard against such exploits. The state of the art in 
Cloud-based IDS and IDP systems is rudimentary: many 
CSPs and their tenants must rely on conventional IDS and 
IDP solutions to provide bastion security capability. 
SaaS – In SaaS, each hosted application instance, on 
behalf of each MTA tenant, shares a single instance of 
object code. When mistakes are made or code corrupts in 
memory, potentially millions of clients may access private 
data of other clients [6].  
A potential countermeasure to these risks is to develop 
SaaS solutions using Aspect-Oriented Programming 
(AOP). AOP effectively removes or abstracts the security 
implementation protecting the data in the service, from the 
core underlying service functionality [1]. This approach 
allows each client to implement different security measures 
(encryption algorithm, cipher strength, authentication and 
access mechanism) but use the same object code.  
PaaS – in PaaS, each tenant in an MTA may have the 
various layers of their hosted solution – business logic, data 
access logic and storage, presentation logic – in turn hosted 
across multiple physical servers. The risk with PaaS in a 
multi-tenant environment is fundamentally one of lack of 
configuration information – which part of a specific 
tenant’s platform solution runs where? 
This risk can be countered and partially mitigated by 
maintaining a dependency map for each tenant. The cloud 
provider needs to have a dynamically managed and updated 
mapping of underlying technical infrastructure to each 
client’s virtualized servers or hosted run-time instances. 
This helps at least in problem determination and 
communication management; if a particular portion of the 
infrastructure is compromised, the CSP can at least identify 
(and potentially notify) the tenants that are affected by the 
breach [6]. 
The overall multitenant risk for IaaS, PaaS and, to a 
lesser extent, SaaS tenants can be reduced and in some 
cases eliminated by “Virtual Private Cloud”, whereby the 
CSP offers, potentially at a billable premium, a logically or 
physically segregated infrastructure upon which to run. 
This countermeasure, however, has the effect of reducing 
or eliminating the business case for Cloud computing in the 
first place. If every risk-averse tenant demands their own 
physical infrastructure, then the CSP essentially becomes a 
co-location provider and can offer little beyond the low-





Network design and implementation in a Cloud 
environment is a relatively mature and stable discipline, 
since network protocols operate at a much lower layer than 
Cloud-based computing typically impacts. The network 
configuration for IaaS and PaaS MTA Clouds leverages the 
expertise and best practices of conventional datacenter 
design. Secure routing, firewalls, VPNs, VLANs and other 
network virtualization technologies are all used to securely 
segregate client traffic, with network-level encryption 
ensuring that data in transit is secure for all tenants in an 
MTA.  
The consequences of poor network design within a 
CSP’s network, however, put MTA tenants immediately at 
risk of compromise from within another tenant’s internal 
network, since there may not be adequate compensating 
controls within a CSP’s network to detect, diagnose, and 
resolve attacks originating from one tenant and targeting 
another. A paper by scientists at the National University of 
Defense Technology in China [5] has outlined the forensics 
of a so-called “shrew” attack within a Cloud environment, 
where the extremely low number of packets constituting the 
attack payload, and the extremely short duration of the 
attack, makes the attack fingerprint hard to detect. 
Additionally, the countermeasures rely on very 
knowledgeable network administrators to implement at the 
core switching and routing points of the CSP’s network.  
One consequence of MTA, however, is the network 
access required by administrators and users of Cloud-based 
applications, originating from outside of the CSP’s network 
address space. Typically, each tenant requires a discreet set 
of IP addresses, routable and accessible from the public 
Internet, in order to access their applications and 
administration consoles. The CSP is responsible for 
managing a limited pool of IPv4 addresses and subnets, and 
must ensure that each tenant has their own dedicated 
addresses.  
A phenomenon has been observed, however, where 
CSPs, either through necessity or through neglect, fail to 
properly manage their address pools. As tenants are added, 
and additional servers and application run-time 
environments are provisioned and de-provisioned, it may 
become possible for an IP address to be insufficiently 
“aged” – that is, the underlying virtualized services of a de-
provisioned tenant may be available, for a short period of 
time, via their old IP address and port number [10]. 
The obvious countermeasure to this security risk is to 
ensure that server and IP address provisioning and de-
provisioning occur in lockstep. This requires the 
provisioning capabilities of server infrastructure (typically 
handled by one group within the CSP) and network 
infrastructure (handled by another group) to be harmonized, 
so that the environments are set up and torn down at the 
same time.  
 
Availability in an MTA Environment 
 
Availability forms the third “pillar” of the so-called CIA 
security pyramid, with Confidentiality and Integrity 
forming the other two. MTA environments may pose 
availability risks to some tenants, based on the activities of 
other tenants on the same infrastructure and platforms.  
For instance, there is risk to availability through lack of 
concerted, global workload optimization, particularly for 
batch processing (described below) and particularly within 
SaaS CSPs.  
Most Cloud workload management is based on 
optimizing tenant resource allocations for interactive dialog 
systems – e.g. online e-Business, social media, and time-
sensitive human interaction. However, workload 
optimization and resource allocation for batch-based 
systems is fundamentally different. Batch-based computing 
typically involves single-threaded applications, 
asynchronous processing, serial execution of job steps, and 
high rates of I/O to large sequentially organized datasets 
[7]. This introduces a risk, exposed by SaaS offerings that 
use a single application server instance to service multiple 
tenants. The potential therefore exists for one tenant to grab 
more than their allocated share of computing resources, for 
an extended period of time, during periods of high batch 
activity. This behavior may be permitted, or even 
encouraged, given the “elastic compute” nature of Cloud 
service offerings. 
As a result, Batch workload planning and optimization 
may require multiple tenants within an MTA to sign up for 
a centralized batch production scheduling service. Momm 
and Theilmann [7] propose a four-step workload planning 
approach: 
 
a. Initial Performance Evaluation  – the 
characteristics of the batch execution environment 
are first measured, gathered, and analyzed to form 
a performance baseline against which further 
improvements will be measured. 
 
b. Tenant Placement – this step involves finding the 
minimum set of required application server 
instances to serve multiple tenants while still 
guaranteeing SLA performance levels to 
individual tenants. 
 
c. Batch job planning – this step creates a “master 
job schedule” that can service all clients while 
minimizing the penalties for time constraints 
 
d. Collect and analyze data for re-planning – this step 
checks progress against the baseline determined in 
step a and suggests further refinements in the plan, 
forming a closed feedback loop for re-
optimization of scheduling algorithms. 
 
 




MTA Cloud service offerings provide fundamental data 
security and protection through strong encryption protocols, 
with each tenant owning the encryption keys and in some 
cases managing the creation, storage and destruction of 
their own keys. 
 
However, most CSPs suffer from a lack of “security by 
diversity”. In MTAs, the data of several (or potentially all) 
MTA clients is encrypted with the same encryption 
algorithm, either AES, Blowfish, or any other industrial-
strength encryption suite. However, a risk exists in that if 
the encryption protocol is compromised, or the cipher suite 
is actually “broken”, then the compromise of one tenant’s 
encryption potentially enables or eases compromise of 
others [1]. 
Two possible countermeasure have been proposed by 
Wood and Anderson [1]: 
 
• Predicate Encryption - each master key owner 
has more fine-grained control over who gets 
access to encrypted data. This allows segments of 
a data store to be encrypted and decrypted, so that 
individuals may only have access to their 
particular segments. Compromise of an individual 
segment does not necessarily mean that all other 
segments are in jeopardy. 
 
• Homomorphic Encryption – this is a mechanism 
by which cipher text can be processed, without the 
need to decrypt data prior to processing. This 
eliminates or reduces the opportunity for a 
malicious party to intercept decrypted data during 
processing. 
 
Logical Authentication and Access Controls 
 
Authentication and authorization form the basis for 
application security. The security disciplines related to 
enterprise identity management (authentication) and access 
management (authorization) are very mature in 
conventional datacenter environments.  
This rigor, however, is not always easily translated to 
multi-tenant Cloud service offerings. Wood and Anderson 
[1], supported by Tsai and Shao [6] demonstrate that so-
called “virtual teams”, consisting of individuals from 
multiple geographies, cultures and backgrounds, are most 
likely to use and support MTA Cloud solutions, and 
experience more frequent turnover and volatile membership 
than conventional corporate teams.  
The fundamental difficulty in access management is that 
of 1). controlling many different data and application 
resources; 2). provisioning fine-grained access to those 
resources; and 3). designing an access control mechanism 
employing a large number of authorization rules, across 
conflicting policy domains, for large numbers of users[2]. 
These are precisely the environments serviced by large, 
multi-tenant Cloud service providers.  
The most common countermeasure for this type of 
complexity risk is Role-Based Access Control [6].  RBAC 
involves two phases in assigning a privilege to a user:  
 
• phase 1 – a user is assigned to one or a small 
number of roles:  
 
• phase 2 – privileges (i.e. access to resources)  are 
assigned to roles,  not users  
 
Through RBAC, users acquire and accumulate 
permissions by their membership in roles, which can be 
dynamically assigned, re-assigned and revoked without 
changing the underlying permissions. In most cases, the 
total number of roles is typically much smaller than the 
total number of users. This tends to reduce complexity for 
access control within typical large enterprises.  
Multi-tenant Cloud service offerings encounter this 
complexity at an even higher level. The complexity stems 
from multiple role-based access mechanisms, or 
hierarchies, applying to the same user, or to the same 
resource. These hierarchies are potentially in conflict with 
one another.  
To address the need to reconcile multiple RBAC 
hierarchies within a Cloud, Tsai and Shao [6] propose an 
“ontology-based” access control mechanism for 
determining user entitlements and extend RBAC to MTA.  
In this approach, role hierarchies are reduced to 
“ontologies” or distilled role properties, which are assigned 
to standard templates. In a given security domain, where 
multiple ontologies exist and must be enforced, the 
templates determine similarities and differences between 
different ontologies at run-time. A resultant set of 
permissions, inherited from multiple roles, can then be 
applied to a security principle (end user) at time of access. 
This countermeasure, extended to MTA, can apply 
permissions to a role instead of a tenant, or an individual 
role in multiple sessions with multiple tenants in an MTA. 
This is important where an agent, acting on behalf of the 
CSP, must execute a security function or audit process 
across multiple tenants in the MTA.  
 
Identity and Access Management 
 
Multitenant Cloud service offerings have a greater need 
for all the services of an integrated Identity and Access 
Management solution - single-sign-on, RBAC and 
delegation – every cloud implementation should include a 
complete IAM solution [1]. IAM enables persistent 
authorization for customers in terms of their identity and 
entitlement across multiple clouds. 
There are significant challenges to applying standard 
IAM standards and specifications to Cloud computing. 
Mather et al [9] advocate the approach of  “federating” 
IAM solutions across multiple clouds, or across tenants in 
an MTA. 
Federated Authentication - While standards are 
generally weak and in development, some (for instance, 
Open Authentication (OAuth and OpenID) have the ability 
to extend consumer-based SSO to enterprise.[4] Users of 
social networking sites like Facebook are familiar with 
supplying their Facebook credentials to other websites (like 
message boards, blogs, and third-party services like Twitter 
and LinkedIn) in order to establish user privileges. Similar 
solutions for enterprise systems offer a similar passport-like 
experience to the end user, whereby their global credentials 
are recognized by services elsewhere in the Cloud. 
Federated access management – under this model, CSP’s 
delegate authentication to a third party through Identity 
Management-as-a-Service (IDaaS) providers. This can 
greatly simplify access management for MTA Cloud 
service offerings. Federated access management relies on 
security policy composition across multiple CSP’s (similar 
to service composition in SOA). This contributes to 
building a “global metapolicy” integrating the policies of 
individual clouds. Amutairi et al [9] foresees this policy 
composition eventually resulting in a Virtual global 
directory service and a Virtual Resource Manager (VRM) 
controlling distributed Access Control Modules (ACM) in 
different clouds, or on behalf of tenants in an MTA. 
 
Risk Countermeasure 
Data isolation Data management protocols 
Interference between tenants 
because of  tenant workloads. 
1 Platform attestation, 
2 Vigilance on the part of the CSP, in 
maintaining, patching and upgrading their 
hypervisor software 
3 Four-step workload planning approach: 
 
a. Initial Performance Evaluation 
b. Tenant Placement 
c. Batch job planning  
d. Collect and analyze data for re-
planning  
Resources being  assigned to 
consumers whose identities, and 
intentions,  are  unknown. 
Auditing all administrative access to systems 
Uncoordinated change controls and 
misconfigurations. 
Appropriate  Governance, Control and 
Auditing  
Comingled tenant data. Appropriate  Governance, Control and 
Auditing  
The risk with PaaS in a multi-
tenant environment is 
fundamentally one of lack of 
configuration information – which 
part of a specific tenant’s platform 
solution runs where? 
This risk can be countered and partially 
mitigated by maintaining a dependency map 
for each tenant. 
SaaS – In SaaS, each hosted 
application instance, on behalf of 
each MTA tenant, shares a single 
instance of object code. When 
mistakes are made or code corrupts 
in memory, potentially millions of 
clients may access private data of 
other clients [6].  
A potential countermeasure to these risks is 
to develop SaaS solutions using Aspect-
Oriented Programming (AOP). AOP 
effectively removes or abstracts the security 
implementation protecting the data in the 
service, from the core underlying service 
functionality [1]. This approach allows each 
client to implement different security 
measures (encryption algorithm, cipher 
strength, authentication and access 
mechanism) but use the same object code.  
Inherent risks of cloud computing. The overall multitenant risk for IaaS, PaaS 
and, to a lesser extent, SaaS tenants can be 
reduced and in some cases eliminated by 
“Virtual Private Cloud”, whereby the CSP 
offers, potentially at a billable premium, a 
logically or physically segregated 
infrastructure upon which to run. 
CSPs fail to properly manage their 
address pools 
Ensure that server and IP address 
provisioning and de-provisioning occur in 
lockstep. 
Lack of “security by diversity”. In 
MTAs, the data of several  clients 
is encrypted with the same 
encryption algorithm,  
Predicate Encryption     
 
Homomorphic Encryption 
Access management - designing an 
access control mechanism 
employing a large number of 
authorization rules, across 
conflicting policy domains, for 
large numbers of users. 
Role-Based Access Control  
 
Table 1: Summary of the risks and their countermeasures 
 
CONCLUSION 
Multitenancy is indeed a double edge sword in the world 
of cloud computing.  The economies of scale realized by a 
multitenant systems allows the service provider to pass 
savings onto the user thus reducing their overall operating 
costs and indeed their total cost of ownership.  However, 
multitenancy, by its very nature, introduces a unique 
security risk to the cloud computing environment.  The user 
must be aware of these risks and must be intentional in their 
efforts to take the appropriate countermeasures.  Some 
suggested countermeasures fall into three broad categories: 
Governance, Control and Auditing Configuration, Design 
and Change Management, Logical Security, Access Control 
and Encryption.  Table 1 is a summary the risks mentioned 
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